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 Introduction 
 Who would have believed in the ﬁ rst years of the 21st century that so 
many democracies across the globe would be put under such enormous 
pressure by populist movements, parties, and politicians; that the prin-
ciples of liberal democracy such as the separation of powers, the rule of 
law, the freedom of the press, and minority rights, would come under 
such intense attack; that the term ‘political elite’ would have pejora-
tive connotations for so many citizens; or that ethno-nationalist rhetoric 
would become such a common feature of public discourse? However, as 
populist parties and politicians have assumed power across Europe and 
beyond, there has been growing uncertainty, and some disagreement, 
about whether populism poses an existential threat to the very founda-
tions of liberal democracy and its values, or whether it is refreshing rep-
resentative democratic politics often characterized by declining political 
participation and disillusionment (e.g.,  Abts & Rummens, 2007 ;  Cano-
van, 1999 ;  Kriesi, 2014 ;  Mudde, 2004 ; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 
2017;  Taggart, 2004 ). This volume seeks to contribute to current eff orts 
from various social sciences that attempt to explain the circumstances 
and mechanisms that contribute to the success or failure of populism and 
populist communication in diff erent countries, among diff erent segments 
of the population, and in diff erent types of media. It is guided by two 
major premises. 
 First, the authors in this collection begin with the assumption that 
populism can only be fully understood if the role played by commu-
nication and the media is taken seriously. Therefore, building upon 
prior work (e.g.,  Mazzoleni, 2008 ;  Moffi  tt, 2016 ;  Moffi  tt & Tormey, 
2014 ), it conceptualizes populism as a type of political communica-
tion that is characterized by speciﬁ c, unique message elements and their 
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combination (e.g.,  Reinemann, Aalberg, Esser, Strömbäck, & de Vreese, 
2017 ;  de Vreese, Esser, Aalberg, Reinemann, & Stanyer, 2018 ). Several 
recent publications have pointed out that despite the huge importance 
of, and changes in, the media environment, many analyses of populism 
have demonstrated a blind spot when it comes to the media and com-
municative processes (e.g.,  Aalberg, Esser, Reinemann, Strömbäck, & 
de Vreese, 2017 ;  de Vreese et  al., 2018 ). This has begun to change 
recently with publications focusing on, for example, online activities of 
populist actors (e.g.,  Engesser, Fawzi, & Larsson, 2017 ;  Krämer, 2017 ; 
 Zulianello, Albertini, & Ceccobelli, 2018 ), media coverage of populism 
(e.g.,  Wettstein, Esser, Schulz, Wirz, & Wirth, 2018b ), and the eff ects of 
populist elements of communication upon citizens (e.g.,  Müller et al., 
2017 ;  Hameleers et al., 2018 ;  Wirz et al., 2018 ). However, there remain 
a lot of unanswered questions. With this volume, we seek to further 
contribute to this recently increasing interest in the communicative and 
media-related aspects of populism. 
 Second, the authors in this volume argue that our understanding 
of populism can hugely beneﬁ t from systematic comparisons of vari-
ous national contexts, various groups of actors or organizations, and 
diff erent types of media. Although the surge of populism may some-
times appear to be an almost uniform trend across countries, a closer 
look reveals that there are diff erences, for example, with respect to 
the historical development of populist parties and their electoral out-
comes. These diff erences require explanation and, at the same time, 
constitute the invaluable variance that will enable us to identify the 
situational and structural factors that contribute to the rise and fall of 
populism. Again, such comparative studies of populist communication 
have long been scarce. Only recently, scholars have made consider-
able progress in this respect by applying internationally comparative 
designs to investigate the rhetoric of populists (e.g.,  Ernst, Engesser, 
Büchel, Blassnig, & Esser, 2017 ;  Zulianello et al., 2018 ), media cov-
erage of populism (e.g., Wettstein et al., 2018a), citizen engagement 
with populist communication (e.g.,  Bobba, Cremonesi, Mancosu, & 
Seddone, 2018 ), and eff ects of populist communication (e.g.,  Müller 
et al., 2017 ;  Hameleers et al., 2018 ). Ideally, such comparisons take 
into account the multi-level structure of factors inﬂ uencing the senders, 
mediators, and receivers of populist communication by including, for 
example, contextual information regarding country characteristics such 
as unemployment rates or migration ﬁ gures into their analysis (e.g., 
 Hameleers et al., 2018 ), but this also poses considerable conceptual and 
methodological challenges. The empirical chapters in this volume also 
contribute to the comparative perspective on populist communication 
by using systematically comparative designs, although they do not all 
apply multi-level approaches. 
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 Populist Political Communication as a Multi-
Dimensional and Gradual Phenomenon 
 As presented elsewhere ( Aalberg et al., 2017 ;  de Vreese et al., 2018 ), the 
authors of this volume argue that communicative processes are crucial 
to understanding populism. Despite ongoing disputes about the concept, 
there is a growing consensus that looking at populism from a communica-
tion and media perspective off ers unique and important insights into the 
functioning of populism, especially in times of a rapidly changing high-
choice media environment that may have altered the very foundations of 
contemporary populist success (Van Aelst et al., 2017;  de Vreese et al., 
2018 ). 
 In addition, scholars seem to agree that references to the communicative 
construction of, and a focus on, ‘a homogenous people’ can be regarded 
as a key component of populist ideology and mindset (‘people-centrism’, 
‘heartland framing’) (e.g.,  Canovan, 1999 ;  Mudde, 2004 ; Taggart, 2004). 
This means that the primary deﬁ ning feature of populism is the construc-
tion of an in-group of ‘the people’ or appealing to citizens’ identity as 
part of ‘the people’. However, since ‘the people’ is a vague term, it comes 
with diff erent connotations and thus diff erent meanings (e.g., the people 
as sovereign, class, ethnic group, nation, ordinary people) (e.g.,  Mény & 
Surel, 2002 ; also Laclau, 2005). These meanings can either be explicitly 
expressed in populist messages, or be more implicit. In that case, the 
connotations of terms such as ‘we’ or ‘the people’ must be recognized 
and reconstructed by audiences in the process of reception (see  de Vreese 
et al., 2018 ;  Reinemann et al., 2017 ). Other authors, also included in this 
volume, hold the view that a focus on restoring popular sovereignty, vis-
à-vis the elites, constitutes another element that can be distinguished from 
both people-centrism and anti-elitism (i.e., the chapters by Blassnig et al., 
Maurer et al., and Esser et al.). Although such a focus on ‘the people’ 
may seem unproblematic and almost natural in democracies, populism 
is considered a threat to democracy by many scholars, politicians, and 
journalists because of its illiberal and authoritarian overtones. Many of its 
representatives tend to support a pure rule of the ‘real’ majoritarianism, 
oppose intermediaries such as the media and open political discourse, 
and show preference for ethnic and cultural homogeneity (e.g.,  Abts & 
Rummens, 2007 ). 
 The core element, ‘people-centrism’, is usually combined with other 
ideological or message elements, most importantly anti-elitism and 
anti-outgroup stances (see  Jagers & Walgrave, 2007 ). Political elites 
and horizontal or vertical out-groups (‘them’; e.g., immigrants, ethnic 
minorities, the wealthy) can be regarded as functional equivalents in that 
they represent the standard to which ‘the people’ (‘we’) are compared 
and contrasted with. Such a focus on intergroup diff erences can, on the 
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one hand, strengthen identiﬁ cation with the in-group, foster in-group 
favoritism, and contribute to self-enhancement and the reduction of self-
uncertainty. On the other hand, it can give rise to notions of out-group 
homogeneity, negative stereotypes of out-groups, negative intergroup 
emotions, and scapegoating. By this, populism delivers a problematic 
answer to the ever-present problem of social cohesion that mass democ-
racies are constantly confronted with and that becomes especially press-
ing in times of crisis when people look for quick and easy solutions 
and actors or groups they can hold accountable (e.g.,  Reinemann et al., 
2017 ;  Hameleers et al., 2018 ; and the theory chapter by Hameleers et al. 
in this volume). 
 It is apparent from the above that we consider populist political com-
munication to be a multi-dimensional phenomenon that can present itself 
in many diff erent shapes and forms. These forms are deﬁ ned by the com-
bination of diff erent elements of populism, resulting in diff erent types 
of, for example, left-wing, right-wing, or empty populism (e.g.,  Jagers & 
Walgrave, 2007 ). In addition, we regard populism as a phenomenon that 
can be more or less pronounced in the ideology and messaging of actors. 
This means that actors, parties, citizens, or media can score higher or 
lower on a populism scale depending on the importance of populist posi-
tions in their ideology or mindset or the frequency with which they spread 
populist message elements. 
 The Rise of Populism—Causes and Missing Links 
 Generally speaking, populist parties have gained traction in recent 
decades. In Europe, this process started in the 1980s, but has been par-
ticularly pronounced since the beginning of the new millennium and has 
further accelerated since 2012 (see  Heinö, 2017 , also  Inglehart & Norris, 
2016 ). This development has long been almost exclusively the result of 
the rise of right-wing populism. Whereas the average vote share of right-
wing populist parties in European national elections was about 1 percent 
in the 1980s, it reached almost 13 percent in 2017. In contrast, left-
wing populist parties lost support between the 1980s and 2012 but have 
gained ground again since then with an average of approximately 6 per-
cent of votes in European national elections in 2017 (see  Heinö, 2017 , 
also  Inglehart & Norris, 2016 ). This means that, taken together, populist 
actors from both the left and the right have been more successful in recent 
European elections than ever before, holding almost one out of every ﬁ fth 
seat in European national parliaments. In contrast, extremist, openly anti-
democratic parties hold just 1.6 percent of all national parliamentary seats 
( Heinö, 2017 ). Moreover, populist parties have entered national govern-
ments in a number of European countries, including Austria, Hungary, 
Poland, and Switzerland. Even in Germany, where populist and extremist 
parties had been relatively unsuccessful for historical reasons, a right-wing 
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populist party has entered the national parliament in the aftermath of the 
2015 refugee crisis. 
 The reasons for the rise of populism seem to be complex. Generally, 
scholars distinguish between demand and supply-side factors that typi-
cally have to interact to enable populist actors to thrive (e.g.,  Guiso, Her-
rera, Morelli, & Sonno, 2017 ;  van Kessel, 2013 ). Demand for populist 
politics among citizens is often considered to be triggered by rapid and 
far-reaching social change or situations of crisis that lead to feelings of 
anxiety and perceptions of deprivation and social injustice. Research 
particularly points towards  economic and  cultural developments that 
have in the past been successfully targeted, fueled, and instrumental-
ized by populists (e.g.,  Inglehart & Norris, 2016 ;  Lucassen & Lubbers, 
2012 ;  van Hauwaert & van Kessel, 2018 ). On the one hand, economic 
or ﬁ nancial downfall and crisis can contribute to economic insecurity 
or suff ering among the population who are then attracted to a ‘uniﬁ ed 
nativist’, protectionist, or isolationist response presented by populists as 
a solution to those problems (e.g.,  Becker, Fetzer, & Novy, 2016 ;  Otjes, 
Ivaldi, Jupskas, & Mazzoleni, 2018 ). On the other hand, increasing social 
diversity brought about by migration and the emancipation of formerly 
underprivileged groups may trigger feelings of relative deprivation, fear of 
being disadvantaged and culturally side-lined, or even fear of becoming a 
victim of crime. More broadly, some authors suggest that globalization, 
which has brought about both economic insecurity  and cultural threats, 
at least in some places, provides fertile ground for populism and redeﬁ nes 
traditional political cleavages ( Kübler & Kriesi, 2017 ;  Rodrik, 2018 ). 
 What is often missing from such explanations of populism is the fact 
that macro-level circumstances  as such cannot be perceived directly by citi-
zens and that their interpretation is not self-evident. Instead, perceptions of 
real-world circumstances and their interpretations are signiﬁ cantly aff ected 
by messages from political actors and the media. In fact, numerous studies 
conclude that media and politicians considerably inﬂ uence citizens’ percep-
tions of, for example, the state of the economy (e.g.,  Bisgaard & Slothuus, 
2018 ;  Lischka, 2015 ) or certain societal groups such as immigrants (e.g., 
 Atwell Seate & Mastro, 2016 ). Moreover, varying media diets and infor-
mation environments result in diverging views and even misperceptions 
among diff erent sections of the population (e.g.,  Cacciatore et al., 2014 ). 
Therefore, it can be argued that citizens’  information environment , and 
the messages and interpretations of politics and the media, are a  missing 
link that connects real-world circumstances and citizens’ perceptions. This 
information environment is often neglected in literature on the causes of 
populism, although it may be key to explaining its rise. 
 A similar observation can be made with respect to the supply-side fac-
tors. The fact that populist parties and politicians exist is not itself suffi  cient 
to explain their success or failure. Instead, these actors need to capitalize 
on the trends mentioned above, or even construct or exaggerate them, 
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for political gain. They need to make ‘the people’ and anti-elite or anti-
outgroup stances key features of their messaging, and use various channels 
of communication to reach their target audiences in order to spread their 
version of reality, their political stances, and their attributions of respon-
sibility. These channels can either be news media that pick up populist 
communication or channels of direct communication, most importantly, 
online and social media channels (e.g.,  Engesser, Ernst, Esser, & Büchel, 
2016 ;  Engesser et al., 2017 ;  Groshek & Koc-Michalska, 2017 ). 
 In order to account for the role played by intermediaries such as politi-
cians and the media,  Reinemann et al. (2017 ) suggest a heuristic model 
for the analysis of populist communication and its eff ects. The model 
includes diff erent levels of analysis and explicitly distinguishes between 
real-world circumstances (macro-level), their representation in public dis-
course (meso-level), and citizen perceptions (micro-levels). This allows for 
the possibility that real-world conditions, their representation in political 
and media messages, and their perception by citizens may diverge and 
thereby either help or hinder the success of populist actors. In addition, 
the model also takes into account the possibility that the media them-
selves not only act as mediators of populist messages via political actors 
( populism through the media ), but that they act as populist actors in their 
own right using populist rhetoric ( populism by the media ). A recent study 
shows, for example, that journalists, especially in tabloid newspapers, 
often present themselves as the voice of the people, portraying the people 
in a positive light and making advocative statements on their behalf. The 
same journalists also demonstrate an anti-establishment bias, portray-
ing political elites in a negative light and making conﬂ ictive statements 
toward them (Wettstein et al., 2018a) ( Figure 1.1 ). 
 Populist Political Communication in Comparative 
Perspective 
 In addition to a focus on the often ‘missing part’ played by communica-
tion and the media, we argue here, and elsewhere, that our understanding 
of populism can beneﬁ t from a systematic comparative investigation. In 
 Figure 1.1 , this notion is represented by the long-term structural, and 
the more short-term situational, contextual factors on the macro-level 
of the model. One major argument for the importance of a comparative 
approach comes from the simple observation that, although populism 
seems to be a global phenomenon ( Rovira Kaltwasser, Taggart, Espejo, & 
Ostiguy, 2017 ), the form, visibility, and success of populism varies con-
siderably across nations. For example, whereas the governing populist 
parties in Hungary and Poland gained the support of more than half of 
the electorate in the last national elections, total vote shares of all populist 
parties are half that size or less in countries like Norway, the Netherlands, 
or the United Kingdom (e.g.,  Heinö, 2017 ). 
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 This points ﬁ rst of all to the relevance of contextual macro-level factors. 
Countries may be diff erently aff ected by negative economic or cultural 
developments such as ﬁ nancial or migration crises, providing diff erent 
opportunity structures for populist messages. For example, a recent com-
parative study shows that the level of unemployment aff ects the mobiliz-
ing potential of populist messages (e.g.,  Hameleers et al., 2018 ). Second, 
countries may also diverge with respect to their political culture or the 
general level of trust in the political system and therefore provide a more 
or less fertile ground for populist appeals in times of crisis or crisis rheto-
ric. Third, these factors may also aff ect how political actors and the media 
on the meso-level engage in, or react to, populist messaging. For example, 
Wettstein et al. (2018a) point to diff erences between countries like Bel-
gium or France, within which established parties built a  cordon sanitaire 
around populist parties by excluding them from any form of coalition, 
and countries in which populists have been a part of government such as 
Austria, Greece, or Bulgaria. Obviously, the political exclusion of populist 
actors in countries with a  cordon sanitaire also encouraged journalists to 
depart from standard norms of neutrality and contributed to a coverage 
in which populists were treated as marginal, laughable, or dangerous. 
 Overall, only a comparative analysis can reveal and explain similari-
ties and diff erences in the communicative aspects of populism across 
countries. However, as several authors have noted, there is still a lack of 
comparative analyses of populist communication—even if an increasing 
number of such studies have been published recently (e.g.,  Hameleers 
et al., 2018 ;  Wettstein et al., 2018b ;  Schulz, Wirth, & Müller, 2018 ; 
 Zulianello et al., 2018 ). It is therefore still necessary to add to our under-
standing of populism by looking at it from a comparative perspective and 
to identify contextual (and individual-level) factors that might help to 
explain diff erences between countries. Only then will we achieve a more 
comprehensive understanding of today’s populism. 
 The Genesis and Structure of This Volume 
 This volume answers the call for more communication-centered com-
parative research into the populism voiced in recent years (e.g.,  Aalberg 
et al., 2017 ;  de Vreese et al., 2018 ). Whereas attitudes, voting behavior, 
or party platforms have long been addressed in comparative studies (e.g., 
 Oesch, 2008 ;  Pauwels, 2014 ;  Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017 ;  Rooduijn, 
de Lange, & van der Brug, 2014 ), comparative approaches to populist 
political communication by politicians and parties (e.g.,  Ernst et al., 2017 ; 
 Zulianello et al., 2018 ), the media (e.g., Wettstein et al., 2018a), and 
citizens (e.g.,  Müller et al., 2017 ;  Hameleers et al., 2018 ;  Wirz et al., 
2018 ) have only recently become more frequent. This book seeks to add 
to these studies and contribute to answering several key questions regard-
ing populist political communication. The book presents theories and 
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ﬁ ndings from four collaborative and internationally comparative empiri-
cal studies, focusing on (1) politicians’ and journalists’ perceptions of 
populist communication; (2) media coverage of populism; and (3) eff ects 
of populist messages on citizens. The studies are based on comparative 
interview studies with journalists (13 countries) and politicians (11 coun-
tries), a large-scale comparative content analysis (12 countries), and a 
comparative cross-country experiment using nationally representative 
online surveys (15 countries). 
 These studies were conducted in the context of a research network that 
was funded by the European Union framework program Cooperation in 
Science and Technology (COST). With the help of COST, scholars from 
31 European countries and various academic ﬁ elds were able to come 
together and discuss questions related to ‘Populist Political Communica-
tion in Europe’ over a four-year period from 2014 to 2018. The three 
working groups concentrated on the parts played by communicators in 
politics and the media, media coverage, and citizens. This working group 
structure was reﬂ ected in the literature studies conducted by the members 
of the network that were published in  Aalberg et al. (2017 ) and that 
structure is also reﬂ ected in this book. Regarding the genesis of this book, 
it is also important to note that although the European funds provided 
within the COST framework can be used to cover networking and meet-
ing costs, they cannot be used to ﬁ nance actual research, i.e., COST does 
not provide any money for staff , coding, or surveys. This means that the 
funds for the research presented in this book came from various sources 
and the fact that not all countries are present in all studies is often the 
result of a lack of national funding opportunities to enable research within 
this network. 
 With reference to the selection of countries for the diff erent studies, 
it is also important to note that besides theoretical considerations, the 
structure and purpose of the COST scheme and network had an impact 
upon which countries could be covered. The projects had to rely on 
the voluntary participation of country experts present in the network, 
and their time and money resources were usually limited to one project. 
Therefore, although it would have been preferable for them, the diff erent 
studies do not cover the same countries. But, despite that, the relatively 
large number of countries per study ensures that countries with vary-
ing macro-level characteristics, for example, from diff erent regions with 
diff erent economic situations and a varying degree of populist success, 
are represented in all four individual studies. From the total of 22 coun-
tries represented, two countries were covered in all four studies (Greece 
and Italy), six countries in three of the studies, ten countries in two of 
the studies, and four in just one (Austria, Ireland, Sweden, and Turkey). 
Seven of the 22 countries are from Southern Europe, another seven from 
Eastern Europe, three from Northern Europe, and six from Western 
Europe (see  Table 1.1 ). 1 
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 Table 1.1 Countries represented in the studies by European region 
  Perceptions 
of politicians 
(11 countries) 
 Perceptions 
of journalists 
(13 countries) 
 Media 
coverage 
(12 countries) 
 Eff ects on 
citizens 
(15 countries) 
 Southern Europe     
 Greece  {  {  {  { 
 France  –  {  {  { 
 Israel  –  –  {  { 
 Italy  {  {  {  { 
 Portugal  {  {  –  – 
 Spain  {  {  –  { 
 Turkey  –  {  –  – 
 Eastern Europe     
 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
 {  {  –  – 
 Bulgaria  {  {  {  – 
 Czech Republic  –  {  {  – 
 Hungary  {  {  –  – 
 Poland  {  –  {  { 
 Romania  {  {  –  { 
 Serbia  –  {  {  – 
 Northern Europe     
 Denmark  {  {  –  – 
 Norway  {  –  {  { 
 Sweden  –  –  –  { 
 Western Europe     
 Austria  –  –  –  { 
 Germany  –  –  {  { 
 Ireland  –  –  –  { 
 Netherlands  –  –  –  { 
 Switzerland  –  –  {  { 
 United Kingdom  –  –  {  { 
 Part I: Populism and Communicators presents the results of interviews 
with journalists and politicians about how they perceive populism and the 
part played by the media. The chapters in this part argue that it is neces-
sary to our understanding of populist communication, to consider the 
perspective of the actors. First, Salgado and Stanyer reﬂ ect on the ratio-
nale and methodological approach of the two interview studies ( Chap-
ter 2 ), then Stanyer et al. ( Chapter 3 ) describe the results of interviews 
with journalists in 13 countries, and Salgado et al. ( Chapter 4 ) report on 
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interviews with journalists conducted in a slightly diff erent set of another 
11 countries. 
 Reﬂ ecting the focus on media and communication,  Part II: Populism 
in the Media includes three chapters presenting the theory, methods, and 
ﬁ ndings from a comparative content analysis of media in 12 European 
countries. Blassnig et al. explain the rationale of the study, its method-
ological approach, and some basic ﬁ ndings ( Chapter 5 ). Maurer et al. 
look for the eff ects of contextual factors on the representation of populist 
message elements in media coverage ( Chapter 6 ), and Esser et al. take a 
longitudinal perspective and examine the development of populist ele-
ments in media coverage over a period of one year ( Chapter 7 ). 
 Part III: Populism and Citizens comprises four chapters in which 
Hameleers et al. present a theoretical model of the eff ects of populist 
messages on citizens ( Chapter 8 ) as well as the methodological approach 
of a comparative experiment conducted in 15 countries ( Chapter 9 ). Key 
results of this experiment are presented in the next two chapters, with 
Corbu et al. focusing on cognitive eff ects, such as blame attribution and 
stereotypes ( Chapter 10 ), and Andreadis et al. concentrating on eff ects on 
attitudes and voting intentions ( Chapter 11 ). 
 The book closes with a concluding chapter by de Vreese et al. ( Chap-
ter 12 ) that both summarizes key ﬁ ndings from the studies and off ers 
advice on that basis to politicians, journalists, and citizens who are won-
dering how to deal with the challenges posed by populism. 
 Note 
 1 . This regional classiﬁ cation is based on  Aalberg et al. (2017 ) which mainly takes 
into account characteristics of the media system and media-politics relations. 
There are, of course, various ways to classify countries as belonging to diff erent 
regions, depending on the criteria that are used. France, for example, is placed 
in the group of Southern European countries when it comes to its type of media 
system (e.g.,  Brüggemann, Engesser, Büchel, Humprecht, & Castro, 2014 ), 
while the United Nations geoscheme for Europe and EuroVoc (the publications 
offi  ce of the EU) place France in Western Europe. 
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